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I.  INTRODCUTION 
In 1985, in Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge by death 
row inmates to the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) failure to initiate 
enforcement actions against drugs used in capital punishment.  Rehnquist’s majority 
opinion cursorily held that agency decisions not to institute such proceedings are 
unreviewable, and the Court has persistently upheld this principle in Chaney’s 
progeny.  As important as this principle may be, even more important is why the 
FDA chose not to review the safety and efficacy of drugs used in capital punishment. 
                                                                
1Colin Miller is a graduate of the William and Mary School of Law.  His previous article, 
Escape From New York:  Analyzing the State’s Relative Interests in Processing the 
Withdrawal of Life Support and Physician-Assisted Suicide is available at 11 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 779 (2003). 
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First, the FDA argued that lethal injection was a distinctly minority practice 
affecting few prisoners and that scant empirical evidence existed that the drugs used 
in the procedure were dangerous.  Second, it claimed that lethal injection constitutes 
the practice of medicine, and the FDA has a policy of non-interference with 
physician’s professional treatment decisions.  Finally, the FDA asserted that it has a 
policy of not initiating enforcement actions against state laws that are duly 
authorized and further legitimate state interests. 
In 1997, the Supreme Court gave such authorization to states to experiment with 
physician-assisted suicide (PAS).  Although the Court found no right to PAS, it 
explicitly delegated to states the power to legalize and regulate its practice.  Based on 
this decision, Oregon enacted its Death with Dignity Act (DWDA) that same year, 
legalizing PAS for terminally ill patients.  Later, Attorney General John Ashcroft -- 
usually a federalist — challenged the DWDA under the federal Controlled Substance 
Act.  A primary contention of his challenge was that PAS is subject to federal 
regulation because it does not constitute the practice of medicine. 
Concurrently, lethal injection has become the primary, almost the sole, method of 
execution in this country.  Despite frequently clandestine execution procedures, 
many observers have filed reports of “botched” executions based on improper 
dosages and combinations of drugs.  Doctors who treat other prisoners frequently 
participate directly in these executions, and non-medical personnel often improperly 
inject the drugs, causing painful and prolonged deaths. 
While the FDA is under no legal obligation to regulate the drugs used in 
executions, these recent developments certainly create a moral imperative requiring 
review.  This paper will argue that the federal government cannot consistently refrain 
from regulating lethal injection drugs while arguing for prosecution of those 
prescribing drugs to be used by patients in assisted suicide. 
Part II will look at the opinions in Chaney and the factors behind the FDA’s 
decision not to regulate the drugs used in executions.  Part III will look at Oregon’s 
Death with Dignity Act and its authorization by the Supreme Court.  Parts IV-VI will 
analyze how the justifications given by the FDA in the early 1980s, for not 
regulating the drugs used in executions, are no longer valid in 2003.  Part IV will 
discuss how lethal injection now constitutes a serious public health issue.  In the 
early 1980s, only two hundred prisoners were subject to lethal injection, and scant 
evidence existed of its dangerousness.  Now, after two decades of botched 
executions and the ascendance of lethal injection as the near exclusive method of 
execution, it is evident that the process has caused serious damages. 
Part V will look at the inconsistency in the federal government’s classification of 
lethal injection as a legitimate medical practice that the FDA will not regulate and in 
its claim that PAS is an illegal state practice subject to federal nullification.  It will 
argue that lethal injection is 1) more disfavored by medical groups, 2) less consistent 
with the Hippocratic Oath, 3) a more active form of killing for the physician, and 4) 
less consistent with the standard medical treatment model than PAS.  Finally, Part VI 
will discuss how capital punishment is less of a duly authorized state practice than 
PAS.  Specifically, capital punishment has been circumscribed severely by the 
Supreme Court based on doubts as to its constitutionality.  Meanwhile, states have 
been given broad authority to implement PAS statutes.  While there has been less 
time for challenges to PAS statutes, the key point is that the patients who desire PAS 
would never challenge such statutes as cruel and unusual.  
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II.  HECKLER V. CHANEY AND THE FDA’S RELUCTANCE TO ACT 
In 1981, eight death row inmates in Texas and Oklahoma “filed suit in the 
District Court seeking to compel the FDA to fulfill its statutory obligation to 
investigate and to regulate the unapproved use of approved drugs in human 
execution systems.”2  The district court granted summary judgment to the FDA 
because courts presumptively cannot review agency decisions not to institute 
investigations.3  Because the FDA provided reasons for its failure to act, it “had not 
completely abdicated its statutory responsibilities,” and no basis for judicial review 
existed.4 
The Court of Appeals reversed, arguing that judicial review of agency decisions 
not to act is proper only when no “law to apply” to agency nonenforcement exists.5  
The Court found the requisite “law to apply” in a policy statement by the FDA:  
“Where the unapproved use of an approved new drug becomes widespread or 
endangers the public health, the Food and Drug Administration is obligated to 
investigate it thoroughly and to take whatever action is warranted to protect the 
public.”6 
Having established the prerequisite for judicial review, the Court then found that 
the FDA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious for two principal reasons.  First, the 
FDA regulates drugs used in animal euthanasia and on prisoners in clinical 
investigations.7  This review precludes the argument that the FDA should not spend 
its resources regulating drugs inducing death and drugs used solely on prison 
populations.  Second, the Court challenged the FDA Commissioner’s assertion that 
state laws advancing legitimate interests “cannot, as a matter of law, pose … a 
danger to the public.”8  Instead, “uncontroverted evidence … shows that drugs used 
                                                                
2Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  The prisoners claimed that the 
use of barbiturates and paralytics in lethal injections “violated the ‘new drug’ as well as the 
‘misbranding’ provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act ….” Timothy V. Kaufman-
Osborn, Book Review, Regulating Death:  Capital Punishment and the Late Liberal State, 111 
YALE L.J. 681, 714 (2001). 
3Heckler, 718 F.2d at 1178 (holding “that ‘decisions of executive departments and 
agencies to refrain from instituting investigations and enforcement proceedings are essentially 
unreviewable by courts’”) (emphasis in original). 
4Id. at 1179. 
5Id. at 1185 (construing Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975)).  If no law exists, 
regulating agency action (or inaction), the court has no standard under which to judge the 
reasonableness of a decision.  
6Id. 
7Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 2, at 714. This regulation also precludes the argument the 
FDA made early in the litigation that it lacked jurisdiction to regulate drugs used in lethal 
injections.  As the prisoners correctly argued, the FDA “employed much the same logic [the 
prisoners used to argue the FDA can regulate lethal injection drugs] in affirming its authority 
to regulate drugs administered to prison inmates in experimental clinical investigations as well 
as drugs employed by veterinarians to put infirm and diseased animals to death.”  Id.     
8Heckler, 718 F.2d at 1190. 
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in lethal injections pose a substantial threat of torturous pain to persons being 
executed.”9 
Judge Scalia’s dissent, in addition to arguing that judicial review was improper, 
held that the FDA’s decision to forgo regulating lethal injection drugs was not in 
clear error.10  He argued that no serious public health issue existed because only two 
hundred prisoners were on death row in states providing for lethal injection.11  Scalia 
also challenged the inhumanity of lethal injections, claiming that the process is “the 
most ‘humane’ way of putting hopelessly crippled or diseased animals out of their 
misery.”12  He asserted that the report revealing the dangers of lethal injection was 
outdated, based on “medical knowledge and technique thirty years ago ….”13  Scalia 
then charged the majority with misconstruing the dichotomy.  He held that the 
comparison should not be made between unregulated and regulated lethal injection 
drugs but between unregulated lethal injection drugs and other forms of execution 
such as electrocution and the gas chamber.14  In this calculus, the use of even 
unregulated lethal injection drugs is, “in all likelihood substitution of a lesser pain, 
since that is the principal purpose of the lethal injection statutes.”15    
Scalia’s final argument was that the FDA Commissioner had not said that a 
practice must be consistent with public health “only by virtue of the fact that” it is 
authorized by state law.16  Instead, he construed the Commissioner’s assertion as 
holding that the specific nature of lethal injection laws makes them immune from 
judicial review.17  Read one way, this argument could mean that the FDA 
legitimately found that the drugs used in lethal injections were safe and effective.  In 
his Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court, however, the Solicitor 
General seemed to construe this argument as focused on the state interest in 
punishing offenders rather than on the safety and efficacy of lethal injection 
procedures.  After citing Scalia’s above language, the Petition defended the FDA’s 
inaction because “[e]nacting laws to prevent and punish crime is among the most 
important powers of the states ….”18  Inherent in this argument was the belief that 
                                                                
9Id. (citing the ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 REPORT (1953)).  
In 1965, Great Britain abolished capital punishment, so there was no need for further reports.  
Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death:  Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 319, 
373, n.313 (1997) [hereinafter Denno, Executions]. 
10Heckler, 718 F.2d at 1178 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
11Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 2, at 716. 
12Heckler, 718 F.2d at 1177, n.5 (Scalia, J. dissenting).  What Scalia did not address is the 
fact that animals must be put to death by trained personnel such as veterinary surgeons, while 
prisoners are often killed by minimally trained corrections staff members.  See infra note 155. 
13Id. 
14Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 2, at 716. 
15Heckler, 718 F.2d at 1198 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
16Id. at 1177, n.6 (emphasis in original). 
17Id. 
18Heckler v. Chaney, No. 83-1878, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to The United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (Oct. 1983), available 
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/1983/sg830021.txt (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). 
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“[t]he FDA’s decision … was based upon a proper consideration for the principles of 
federalism.”19    
In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, 
concluding that agency decisions against instituting proceedings are not subject to 
judicial review and not reaching the merits of the arbitrary and capricious 
argument.20  Specifically, the Court found that the FDA’s policy statement21 was both 
vague and not a properly adopted agency rule.22  The Court also held that the 
enforcement provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not 
abrogate the presumption that agency decisions are immune from judicial review.23  
Courts have universally adhered to Chaney’s precedent in failing to review agency 
decisions not to act, especially in the lethal injection context.  For instance, a year 
after Chaney, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Randy Woolls’s argument 
that Congress’ failure to provide judicial review for the FDA’s refusal to regulate 
lethal injection drugs constituted cruel and unusual punishment.24  “Only [s]ix days 
after his challenge, Woolls’s execution was botched.”25 
III.  WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG AND OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 
In 1997, the Supreme Court found that terminally ill patients did not have a right 
to physician-assisted suicide (PAS) in Washington v. Glucksberg.26  Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion acknowledged that the Court’s decision did not foreclose the ability 
of states to pass laws legalizing assisted suicide.  In fact, he concluded by indicating 
that “[o]ur holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic 
society.”27  Justice Souter’s concurring opinion was more explicit, concluding that 
“[l]egislatures are not so constrained.”28  He even acknowledged that state 
“experimentation … is entirely proper, as well as highly desirable, when the 
legislative power addresses an emerging issue like assisted suicide.”29  Souter 
basically gave states carte blanch, declaring that “[t]he Court should accordingly stay 
                                                                
19Id. 
20470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985). 
21See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
22Heckler, 470 U.S. at 836. 
23Id. at 837. 
24Woolls v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1986). 
25Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death:  The Troubling Paradox Behind 
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What it Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 
63, 102 (2002) [hereinafter Denno, Paradox].  Woolls had been a drug addict, so executioners 
had difficulty selecting a proper vein for insertion; eventually, “Woolls had to assist execution 
technicians to find an adequate vein.”  Denno, Executions, supra note 9, at 431.  
26521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
27Id. at 735. 
28Id. at 789 (Souter, J. concurring). 
29Id. 
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its hand to allow reasonable legislative consideration.”30  Justice O’Connor further 
concurred that “the … challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for 
safeguarding … liberty interests is entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States … in the 
first instance.”31 
Oregon made its first attempt at legalizing PAS in 1994.  The Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act (DWDA), or Measure 16, was “voted into law by fifty-one percent of 
Oregon’s voters.”32  Soon thereafter, however, the Act was challenged in district 
court, and the court enjoined physicians from assisting in suicides.33  Two years later, 
the court re-affirmed its temporary restraining order,34 but the Ninth Circuit 
eventually directed the district court to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction.35  After this ruling, in 1997, “the Oregon electorate voted to reestablish 
the Oregon Death with Dignity Act with a firm belief that the Act would receive the 
support of the U.S. Supreme Court based on its holdings in Vacco and 
Glucksberg.”36 
As practiced in Oregon, PAS involves a physician prescribing a lethal dosage of 
drugs to a patient, who then ingests the drugs herself to hasten death.37  Under the 
DWDA, only an adult “suffering from a terminal disease”38 may be a candidate for 
PAS.  The Act defined a terminal disease as “an incurable and irreversible disease 
that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, 
produce death within six (6) months.”39  Before a patient may receive assistance, 
                                                                
30Id.  Souter would not even foreclose the possibility of finding a right to assisted suicide 
in the future, indicating, “I do not decide for all time that respondents’ claim should not be 
recognized ….”  Id.  He also “acknowledge[d] the legislative institutional competence as the 
better one to deal with … [PAS] … at this time.”  Id. 
31Id. at 737 (O’Connor, J. concurring).  
32Carol A. Pratt, Efforts to Legalize Physician-Assisted Suicide, New York, Washington, 
and Oregon:  A Contrast Between Judicial and Initiative Approaches - - Who Should Decide?, 
77 OR. L. REV. 1027, 1082  (1998). 
33Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994). 
34Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995). 
35Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997). 
36Alan D. Lieberson, Issues of Concern When Drafting a Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Statute, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 149, 149 (1999). In Vacco v. Quill, the Supreme Court 
found that New York’s legalization of the withdrawal of life support, while it continues to 
prohibit PAS, does not “violate[] the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 521 U.S. 793, 796-97 (1997).  The second time 
voters approved the DWDA, the vote was “60% to 40%.”  Lindsay R. Kandra, Questioning 
the Foundation of Attorney General Ashcroft’s Attempt to Invalidate Oregon’s Death with 
Dignity Act, 81 OR. L. REV. 505, 511 (2002).  
37See David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide:  A Very Modest 
Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REV. 443, 448 (1997) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Legalization]  
(recognizing that “because the patient must self-administer the drug, the patient brings about 
his or her own death.”). 
38OR. REV. STAT. § 2.01 (1997). 
39Id. at § 1.01. 
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“[t]he patient must make one written request and two oral requests to his or her 
physician, and the two oral requests must be separated by at least 15 days.”40  Before 
a patient may receive her prescription, “[t]he physician and a consultant must 
confirm the diagnosis of a terminal condition, determine that the patient is competent 
to make the decision, and refer the patient to counseling if either believes the 
patient’s judgment is impaired by depression or another psychiatric or psychological 
disorder.”41  Finally, “[t]he prescribing physician must inform the patient of 
alternatives including palliative care, hospice and pain management options.”42 
Less than a year after the Act passed, Attorney General Janet Reno actively 
supported it, finding no grounds for adverse action against physicians assisting in 
suicide under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).43  The CSA is administered 
under the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and its stated purpose is to serve 
as “the legal foundation of the government’s fight against the abuse of drugs and 
other substances.”44  Reno first argued that the purpose of the CSA was to prevent 
illicit drug abuse and its concomitant “‘stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic 
effect on the central nervous system,’”45 presenting was no indication it was intended 
to cover terminal sedation, by definition, a single use situation.  Reno then argued 
that the CSA must be read as consistent with federalism and particularly the state’s 
determination of what constitutes the practice of medicine.46 
Congress, however, was not as hospitable.  In 1998, it attempted to proscribe the 
DWDA through “the Lethal Drug Abuse and Prevention Act and again in 1999 with 
the Pain Relief Promotion Act ….”47  While the first Act failed in the House, “[t]he 
second bill passed the House but failed to reach a vote in the Senate.”48  Two years 
                                                                
40Andrew I. Batavia, So Far So Good:  Observations on the First Year of Oregon’s Death 
with Dignity Act, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 291, 295 (2000). 
41Id. 
42Christina E. Manuel, Physician-Assisted Suicide Permits Dignity in Dying, 23 J. LEGAL 
MED. 563, 577, n.118 (2002).  The Act also has other safeguards, such as requiring that the 
physician request that the patient inform her next-of-kin of her decision.  A full list of the 
safeguards can be found, Death With Dignity National Center, Safeguards of the Law, at 
http://www.dwd.org/law/index.asp?IDW590 (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). 
43Statement of Attorney General Reno on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act (June 5, 1998), 
available at http://www.dwd.org/pdf/reno_letter.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) [hereinafter 
Statement].  Reno specifically argued that “adverse action against a physician who has assisted 
in a suicide in full compliance with the Oregon Act would not be authorized by the CSA.” Id.  
44U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Controlled Substances Act, at 
http:www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/csa.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). 
45Statement, supra note 43. 
46See id. (stating that “[t]here is no evidence that Congress, in the CSA, intended to 
displace the states as the primary regulators of the medical profession or to override a state’s 
determination as to what constitutes legitimate medical practice in the absence of a federal law 
prohibiting that practice”). 
47Lindsay F. Wiley, Ashcroft Appeals Assisted Suicide Decision (May 24, 2002), available 
at www.painandthelaw.org/palliative/ashcroft_053002.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).   
48Id. 
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later, new Attorney General John Ashcroft — a staunch supporter of federalism on 
most issues49 — decided to contradict Reno’s position and attempted to nullify the 
DWDA.  In an order entitled “Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist 
Suicide,” Ashcroft asserted that “assisting suicide is not a ‘legitimate medical 
purpose’ within the meaning of” the CSA.50  Ashcroft explicitly disregarded 
federalism concerns, arguing that his “conclusion applies regardless of whether state 
law authorizes or permits such conduct by practitioners ….”51  
Oregon responded to Ashcroft’s order by immediately filing “suit in federal 
district court requesting a temporary restraining order, which was granted on 
November 7, 2001, and then extended until further notice on November 20, 2001.”52  
In April of 2002, the district court entered a permanent injunction preventing the 
federal government from “enforcing, applying, or otherwise giving any legal effect 
to the Ashcroft directive ….”53  The principal ground for this decision was that no 
basis was established in the legislative history, language, or application of the CSA 
to support the conclusion that the federal government could override state decisions 
about what constitutes legitimate medical practice.54  Ashcroft then appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and a three-judge panel heard oral arguments 
in Portland, Oregon, on May 7, 2003.55 
While the ultimate disposition in this case is highly relevant to citizens in 
Oregon, and particularly to those terminally ill patients seeking PAS, whether the 
Court upholds the DWDA should be irrelevant as to whether the FDA should 
regulate the drugs used in capital punishment.  The federal government has clearly 
indicated that it feels an agency such as the DEA has the ability to nullify state law 
and should proscribe the use of drugs in what it feels is not a legitimate medical 
practice.  If the federal government feels that this is a practical use of resources, the 
FDA should also choose to regulate the drugs used in lethal injections unless the 
justifications cited for abstaining in 1983 remain valid today or if stronger reasons 
exist for proscribing PAS.  The following three sections will argue that these 
                                                                
49Jonathan Turley, It’s Not the Cannabis, It’s the Constitution, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2002, 
available at http://www.dutch-passion.nl/news/2002/August/US-%20It's%20Not%20the%20 
Cannabis,%20It's%20the%20Constitution.txt (last visited Apr. 28, 2003). 
50Att’y Gen. Order No. 2534-200121 C.F.R. 1306 (Nov. 9, 2001), available at 
http://www.dwd.org/pdf/ashcroft_letter.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). 
51Id. 
52Manuel, supra note 42, at 583. 
53Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (2002). 
54Id. at 1088-92. 
55Laurence M. Cruz, Appeals Court to Rule First on Assisted Suicide:  The Justice 
Department Wants to Overturn Oregon’s Twice-Affirmed Law, STATESMAN J., March 6, 2003, 
available at http://www.worldrtd.org/AppealsCrt2Rule1.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).  
According to at least one source, the panel was skeptical about the ability of Ashcroft to 
punish physicians under the CSA. Bob Egelko, Court Hears Suicide-Law Case:  Appellate 
Judges Grill Federal Lawyer Over Strategy in Oregon, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 8, 2003, 
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2003/05/08/MN232980.DTL 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2004).  For instance, Judge Tallman argued that the CSA was “was 
intended to curb narcotics trafficking, not medical practice.”  Id. 
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justifications for inaction are no longer valid and that the federal government cannot 
consistently maintain that it can and should prosecute physicians prescribing PAS 
drugs while it fails to regulate lethal injection drugs.        
IV.  THE EMERGENCE OF LETHAL INJECTION AS THE SOLE METHOD OF EXECUTION 
A.  Lethal Injection’s Rise to Exclusivity   
When the prisoners challenged the FDA’s inaction with regard to lethal injection 
drugs in 1981, only four states (eight percent of all states) allowed lethal injection.56  
Further, when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, only one individual had 
been executed by lethal injection:  Charles Brooks, Jr. in 1982.57  As Scalia noted in 
his dissent,58 in 1983, only 200 prisoners were on death row in states that allowed 
lethal injection, while only 1,100 total prisoners were on death row generally.59  
Thus, only about eighteen percent of death row inmates faced the possibility of lethal 
injection. 
In 2003, thirty-seven (seventy-four percent of all states) of thirty-eight death 
penalty states authorized lethal injection as a method of execution;60 thus over 
ninety-seven percent of death row prisoners could be injected with drugs unapproved 
for causing death.  Of the thirty-seven lethal injection states, twenty-seven have 
lethal injection as the sole method of execution.61 
When the Supreme Court handed down its Chaney decision in 1985, 
electrocution remained a practical alternative to lethal injection.  In the ten years 
since 1976, when the Supreme Court lifted the moratorium on capital punishment in 
                                                                
56Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1178 (1983). 
57FREDERICK DRIMMER, UNTIL YOU ARE DEAD: THE BOOK OF EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 78 
(1990).  The non-medical personnel took a long time finding a suitable vein for injection 
because Brooks had been a drug addict, and it took seven minutes for him to die from a 
sodium thiopental overdose.  Jeff Stryker, The Role of Professions in the Execution Process, 
RECORDER, Apr. 23, 1992, at 6.  Other severe complications occurred during the procedure.  
One witness stated that, during the execution, Brooks “moved his head as if to say ‘no.’  Then 
he yawned and his eyes closed, and then he wheezed.  His head fell over toward us, then he 
wheezed again.”  Robert Reinhold, Execution by Injection Stirs Fear and Sharpens Debate, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1982, at A28.  The general consensus among witnesses was that Brooks 
“had not died easily.”  DRIMMER, supra, at 75. 
58See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
59Heckler, 718 F.2d at 1197 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
60Denno, Paradox, supra note 26, at 116 (2002).  The only aberration is Nebraska, which 
only has electrocution.  In 2002, Alabama became the latest state to adopt lethal injection, 
holding that “lethal injection will be used unless an inmate requests the electric chair.” 
Methods of Execution, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=245 (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2004). 
61Denno, Paradox, supra note 25, at 129, tbl. 1.  New Hampshire and Washington provide 
for either lethal injection or hanging, while prisoners in Idaho and Utah have the choice of 
lethal injection or firing squad.  Id.  Electrocution remains an option in Alabama, Florida, 
South Carolina, and Virginia, and lethal gas is authorized as an alternative in California and 
Missouri.  Id. 
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Gregg v. Georgia62 states had electrocuted thirty-four prisoners compared to thirteen 
cases of lethal injection.63  In 1999-2001, however, 240 lethal injections occurred, 
but only 8 electrocutions (the only eight executions not by lethal injection).64  Almost 
ninety-seven percent of executions were by lethal injection, making it constructively 
the only form of execution in this country.65  In 2001, all of the sixty-six executions 
in this country were by lethal injection.66  When this is combined with the fact that 
“no state has moved from lethal injection to another form of execution …, there 
appears to be a national consensus rejecting all methods of execution except lethal 
injection.”67  Internationally, “execution by electrocution is practiced in no other 
country in the world.”68 
This near categorical acceptance of lethal injection as the only proper form of 
capital punishment undermines the validity of Scalia’s dichotomy.  The FDA can no 
longer use the straw man of other execution procedures to claim that lethal injection 
is the “substitution of a lesser pain,”69 or a lesser evil.  In practice, other execution 
procedures have been proscribed, and “it is likely that electrocution will soon be 
extinct.”70 
Even if this is not the case, Scalia still improperly concluded that the choice is 
between the lesser pain of lethal injection and the greater pain of other execution 
procedures.  While the purpose behind the prisoners’ challenge to the FDA’s inaction 
in Chaney may have been for lethal injection drugs to be confiscated as misbranded, 
such drastic action is unnecessary.  The FDA could merely require that 
manufacturers submit these drugs for approval so that universal standards can be 
established regarding which drugs should be used, their dosages and instructions for 
use.71     
                                                                
62428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
63Denno, Paradox, supra note 25, at 129, tbl. 4.  In the year of the Court’s decision, eleven 
executions and seven lethal injections occurred.  Id. 
64Id. 
65See Lethal Injection, at http://www.richard.clark32.btinternet.co.uk/injection.html (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2004) (stating that “[l]ethal injection is now virtually the universal method of 
execution in the United States…”). 
66Denno, Paradox, supra note 25.  All except for one of the seventy-one executions in 
2002 were by lethal injection. Lethal Injection, supra note 65. 
67Kenneth Williams, The Deregulation of the Death Penalty, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
677, 700 (2000). 
68Provenzano v. Moore, 744 S.2d 413, 436 (Fla. 1999) (Shaw, J, dissenting). 
69See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
70Denno, Paradox, supra note 25, at 85. 
71While obviously double blind studies with placebos cannot be conducted when the 
purpose of a drug is to cause death, the FDA could impose less strict guidelines for approving 
lethal injection drugs.  It could look to the data collected in Oregon regarding the safety and 
efficacy of the drugs used in PAS.  Additionally, it could look to foreign countries such as the 
Netherlands where euthanasia is legal to determine what dosages are proper for causing the 
quickest and least painful death.  Finally, the FDA could allow studies to estimate lethal 
dosages for humans based on studies previously submitted to the FDA for approval of drugs 
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Opponents of regulating lethal injection drugs could finally argue that lethal 
injection is still the least harmful method of execution, so the FDA should not be 
concerned with its regulation.  Such a position, however, is fundamentally 
inconsistent with FDA practice.  An example of this is the FDA’s failure to approve 
biliary lithotripters — machines intended to remove gallstones nonsurgically.72  
When the FDA initially failed to approve these machines, the most common (and 
only viable) alternative treatment was cholecysstectomy:  “the complete removal of 
the gallbladder” leading to trauma, incapacity for several weeks, weakness for 
longer, and the necessity of following a low-fat diet for the rest of the patient’s life.73 
While some issues with side effects existed — such as debris clearance — the 
lithotripters were “the only nonsurgical technique to provide rapid and ongoing 
symptomatic relief from the severe pain caused by gallstone disease.”74  Despite the 
fact that use of the lithotripters would be a “substitution of a lesser pain,” the FDA 
did not approve them because of the concerns about side effects.75  Properly 
understood, then, the FDA’s review of drugs and devices is largely insulated from 
the quality of existing treatments.  If a treatment presents serious public health 
issues, the FDA should and does regulate it, regardless of the safety and efficacy of 
other treatments. 
B.  Lethal Injection’s Effect on All Prisoners 
As previously noted, in 1983, during the Chaney litigation, only 200 prisoners 
were on death row in lethal injection states.76  By 2001, the population on death row 
had grown to 3,581, with prisoners in every state but Nebraska subject to lethal 
injection.77  This means that the number of prisoners who can suffer from 
unregulated lethal injection drugs has increased by over 1600% since the FDA held 
that the low number of prisoners subject to lethal injection did not constitute a public 
health problem. 
Conversely, PAS — which Ashcroft found to be enough of a public health 
problem to proscribe — is only legal in one state:  Oregon.  In 1999-2002, only 27, 
                                                          
used in animal euthanasia.  This is essentially what Fred Leuchter did when he was originally 
creating execution machines, but he was later discredited as lacking scientific credentials.  See 
infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
72Lawrence S. Makow, Note, Medical Device Review at the Food and Drug 
Administration:  Lessons from Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy and Bilateral Lithotripsy, 
46 STAN. L. REV. 709, 723 (1994). 
73Id.  Other techniques existed, “[b]ut serious limitations ma[d]e these techniques less 
attractive ….”  Id.  Laparoscopic cholecystectomy, a more viable alternative, was eventually 
approved by the FDA, but it did not exist when the lithotripters were initially being reviewed.  
Id. at 725. 
74Id. at 724. 
75Id. 
76See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
77Curt Anderson, Death Row Population Drops in U.S. for First Time Since 1976, Dec. 16, 
2002, available at http://www.lfexnews.com/1998/2002/texas/texas_Death_row1216.html 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2004). 
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27, 21, and 38 deaths occurred by PAS, respectively.78  While some may attempt to 
compare these numbers with the 66 executions in 2001, the comparison would be 
incorrect.  All of the over 3,500 prisoners on death row in lethal injection states live 
in the shadow of an involuntary execution by drugs unapproved for causing death.  
Terminally ill adults in Oregon who do not want to hasten their deaths are in no way 
subject to being involuntarily exterminated.79    
The harm caused by lethal injection, however, can not be limited to death row 
prisoners.80  Physicians assisting in executions “have a doctor-patient relationship 
with all … inmates ….”81  Consequently, all prisoners are in an awkward position 
with regard to the physicians whom they view as both healer and killer, and “the 
prison physician’s participation causes a deleterious effect on the physician’s 
relationship with other inmates.”82  Of course, this damage is the greatest for death 
row inmates because these “inmates perceive the physicians … as people who will 
kill them someday …”, [l]eading to “complain[ts] about this conflict since they must 
submit to care by the same prison physician.”83   
                                                                
78Oregon Department of Health and Human Services, Fifth Annual Report on Oregon’s 
Death with Dignity Act, available at http://www.ohd.hr.state.or.us/chs/pas/arresult.cfm (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Report]. 
79Critics may argue that the practice of PAS will lead to involuntary euthanasia, 
jeopardizing the lives of patients who do not want to hasten their deaths.  This is a point that 
can be legitimately argued, but there is an equally valid argument that more risk of abuse 
exists where PAS is illegal and practiced in a clandestine, unregulated manner.  By legalizing 
the procedure and establishing safeguards, other terminally ill patients may actually be safer.  
Critics of legalizing PAS often cite the Netherlands — where abuses involving assisted 
suicides have occurred — as a harbinger of a slippery slope when PAS is legalized.  This 
analogy is fallacious because, until recently, “[i]n Holland, assisted suicide [was] officially 
illegal[] but [was] typically not prosecuted under certain specified circumstances.” Batavia, 
supra note 40, at 301.  Conversely, “[i]n Oregon, assisted suicide is officially legal under 
specified circumstances and is illegal under all other circumstances.” Id.  Thus, if anything, the 
previous non-prosecution policy in the Netherlands was more similar to current PAS policy in 
every state except for Oregon.  In every other state, PAS is officially illegal, but no physician 
has ever been convicted of assisting in a suicide.  For instance, Jack Kevorkian was acquitted 
several times for assisting in suicides before he was finally convicted of euthanizing a patient. 
Liz Townsend, Kevorkian’s Nine-Year Euthanasia Crusade Leads to Murder Conviction, 
NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Apr. 8, 1999, available at http://www.nrlc.org/news/1999/ 
NRL499/kev.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). 
80Conversely, it can be argued that the benefit of PAS is not limited to those patients 
electing to receive a lethal prescription of drugs.  See, e.g., David Orentlicher, The Alleged 
Distinction Between Euthanasia and the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment:  
Conceptually Incoherent and Impossible to Maintain, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 837, 845-46 (1998) 
(stating that legalization of PAS has the potential to benefit all terminally ill patients because 
being told that such an option exists “can alleviate their anxiety about what lies ahead”). 
81Stacey A. Ragon, A Doctor’s Dilemma:  Resolving the Conflict Between Physician 
Participation in Executions and the AMA’s Code of Medical Ethics, 20 DAYTON L. REV. 975, 
985 (1995). 
82Id. 
83Id. 
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While some may (speciously) argue that the lives and rights of prisoners are not 
as important as those of law-abiding individuals, “[o]nly a callous mind would claim 
that this is not a serious danger to public health.”84  While “the public perception of 
physicians focuses on the general public …, the relationship of trust is equally 
important in treating inmates because that relationship serves the same purposes.”85   
Ashcroft would have us believe that legalization of PAS creates a similar strain in 
doctor-patient relationships, but, logically, physician assistance in suicide should 
cause substantially less mistrust.  When a physician assists in a suicide, she is 
obeying the wishes of a patient using informed consent.  In executions, the physician 
is working decidedly against the prisoner’s interests and consent.  The “trust … 
threatened by physician participation in executions is the trust[] that physician[s] will 
work for the benefit of their patients.”86  This trust is implicated to a lesser degree 
when the physician supports and assists in what the patient and she believe to be in 
the patient’s best interests.  This theory has empirical support.  In one “survey of 
adult patients, researchers found that 90.5% of patients would consider a physician 
who assisted in suicides to be as trustworthy as other physicians in providing care to 
critically ill patients.”87   
Another reason patients are less likely to be worried about PAS is that 
withdrawal of life support is already legally recognized and widely practiced.  
Withdrawal of life support involves a physician removing a patient from a machine 
keeping that patient alive (and often hastening death through drugs) while, as already 
noted, PAS merely involves a physician prescribing drugs to a patient who self-
ingests the drugs.88  While the Supreme Court has held that these practices are legally 
distinct, “from the perspective of the lay public, a doctor’s pulling of the plug and 
precipitating death may seem as much a killing as provision of a prescription for 
poison.”89 
                                                                
84Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1190, n.44 (1983). 
85Ragon, supra note 81, at 1000. 
86Id. 
87Orentlicher, Legalization, supra note 37, at 452, n.43 (citing Mark A. Graber et al., 
Patients’ Views About Physician Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 11 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 
71, 73 (1996)) (studying 228 patients at a single university-based family practice program); 
see also University of Washington School of Medicine, Ethics in Medicine:  Physician-
Assisted Suicide, at http://eduserv.hscer.washington.edu/bioethics/topics/pas.html (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Ethics] (“Surveys of patients and members of the general public 
find that the vast majority think that PAS is ethically justifiable in certain cases ….”). 
88See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
89Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III, The Legal Bounds of Physician Conduct 
Hastening Death, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 155 (2000); see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 
(1997) (Stevens, J. concurring) (holding that the Court’s “traditional view of the physician’s 
role” is simply inapplicable in an age where “physicians are already involved in making 
decisions that hasten the death of terminally ill patients - - through termination of life support, 
withholding of medical treatment, and terminal sedation”); Stephen A. Newman, Euthanasia:  
Orchestrating “The Last Syllable of…Time,” U. PITT. L. REV. 153, 166 (1991) (“[I]n the 
modern medical setting, these terms and distinctions are ephemeral.  The concept of natural 
death in the hospital has lost its meaning.”).  
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In fact, patients may be less trustworthy of physicians declining to participate in 
PAS.  For these “patients, it would be a physician’s refusal to dispense medication to 
ease their suffering and make their death tolerable and dignified that would be 
inconsistent with the healing role.”90  Many “[p]atients fear that when they are 
suffering intolerably, they will be denied the drugs that are necessary to end their 
suffering.”91  Most Americans are more concerned that modern medical technology 
will artificially prolong lives than with the idea of PAS.92  
Some have even argued that “it is clear … trust cannot survive in the present 
context surrounding dying.”93  These critics doubt that “the public [can] place much 
faith in a process that involves … ‘long, drawn out months to years of increasingly 
complicated illness that can require an array of specialists, confusing choices, false 
hopes, loss of control and dignity, misery and pain.’”94  When we “[a]dd to this 
enormous costs and the propensity of certain doctors to block out others’ suffering, 
to avoid contact with the dying, and to neglect available measures for pain relief, … 
the picture of an ailing doctor-patient relationship becomes complete.”95 
Patients with terminal illnesses primarily fear “doctor neglect and 
abandonment.”96  “[T]he present system fosters [this neglect] by allowing an 
inordinate amount of suffering to continue for months, leading many caregivers to 
simply block it out.”97  When the physician cannot assist in the suicide of a patient in 
great suffering, it is often difficult for her to face the patient, making avoidance the 
only possible response.  “By avoiding the hopeless patient and the family, the doctor 
learns to live with the brutality of prolonged suffering by disregarding it.”98  Worse, 
“a doctor’s refusal to hasten death ‘may be experienced by the [dying] patient as an 
abandonment, a rejection, or an expression of inappropriate paternalistic 
authority.’”99  
Allowing PAS may “foster a deeper dimension to some doctor-patient 
relationships.”100  Legalization of PAS “moves it into the arena for open discussion 
                                                                
90Quill, 521 U.S. at 809 (Stevens, J. concurring); see also Susan Block & J. Andrew 
Billings, Patient Request to Hasten Death, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2039, 2045 (1994). 
91Orentlicher, supra note 37, at 452. 
92See Newman, supra note 89, at 171 (stating that “[t]he public seems to fear the dying 
process now because it believes doctors’ efforts will prolong, not relieve suffering”). 
93Id. at 172 
94Id. (quoting Should Physicians Perform Euthanasia?, AM. MED. NEWS 12, 15 (Jan. 7, 
1991)). 
95Id. 
96Id. at 176. 
97Id. 
98Id. 
99Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 (1997) (Stevens, J. concurring) (quoting Block & 
Billings, supra note 90, at 2045). 
100Id.  
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and consideration.”101  Consequently, “a process of conversation, explanation and 
negotiation may ensue between doctors and patients requesting help in ending 
life.”102  Some have argued that “‘[d]ying is one of life’s most profound experiences.  
To share this … with another who is willing to understand and acknowledge this 
type of suffering, and to act on it, surely must create one of the most trusted bonds 
that can be possible.’”103   
While some may argue that it is hyperbole to claim that legalizing PAS would 
actually improve the doctor-patient relationship, it is at least an argument that can be 
rationally made and supported.  Conversely, there are no legitimate grounds upon 
which one can argue that physicians participating in the involuntary executions of 
prisoners will do anything but harm their relationships with these and other 
prisoners.   
C.  Botched Executions 
From the first lethal injection in 1982 through 2001, there have been 31 reported 
botched executions by lethal injection.104  In reality, this number is probably 
substantially higher, but we cannot be certain of this for two reasons.  The first 
reason is that many states have clandestine execution procedures.  Some states allow 
witnesses to view executions, and these witnesses often become the reporters of 
botched executions.105  In other states, however, such as New York, witnesses are not 
allowed to see the inmate die.106 
Second, because of the drugs used in lethal injections, witnesses may not be able 
to observe that a prisoner is in severe pain.  In most states, three drugs are used in 
lethal injections.  The physician first uses sodium thiopental107 to cause the patient to 
lose consciousness.108  The second drug administered is pancuronium bromide, 
                                                                
101Newman, supra note 89, at 171.  Currently, however, “[m]aking the practice illegal 
discourages discussion.  One must be very sure of others’ reactions before confiding in them.  
The useful deliberation that comes from sharing ideas and perspectives is thereby lost.”  Id. at 
177. 
102Id. at 172 
103Id. (quoting Should Physicians Perform Euthanasia?, AM. MED. NEWS 12, 15 (Jan. 7 
1991)). 
104Denno, Paradox, supra note 25, at 139, tbl. 9.  While it is difficult to define what 
constitutes a “botched” execution, a fair standard seems to be an execution where the patient 
takes longer to die than expected or suffers from severe pain.  Others have claimed a much 
higher rate of error.  See, e.g., Edward Brunner, M.D., Ph.D., Many Lethal Injection 
Executions are Bungled, BALT. SUN (2001) [hereinafter Bungled], available at 
http://www.lairdcarlson.com/celldoor/00302/SW00302LethalInjectionBungled.htm (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2004) (stating that “in about 40 percent of cases where lethal injection has been 
used, there has been misuse in one way or another ….”). 
105Id. at 123-24. 
106Id. at 124-25. 
107PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 835 (55th ed. 2001) [hereinafter REFERENCE]. 
108Patrick Malone, Death Row and the Medical Model, 9 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Oct. 1979, 
at 6. 
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which temporarily paralyzes the lungs and diaphragm to stop breathing.109  The third 
drug — which actually induces death — is potassium chloride, which permanently 
stops the inmate’s heart from beating.”110  
According to studies, when the executioner makes a mistake — “for example, 
pancuronium bromide is administered first — there is near certainty that the inmate 
will experience excruciating pain during a lethal injection even without the outside 
appearance of pain because the pancuronium bromide paralyzes him.”111  The 
prisoner’s suffering begins with “an extremely painful sensation of crushing and 
suffocation” while the prisoner is “unable to move or communicate in any way 
….”
112
  Later, as “potassium chloride is administered, the prisoner will experience an 
excruciating burning sensation is his vein … equivalent to the sensation of a hot 
poker being inserted into the arm ….”113 
Three main causes of botched executions exist.  The first is that there is wide 
variance in the drugs and dosages used in different states.  To begin, when Fred 
Leuchter — the original creator of most execution equipment in this country — was 
deciding on the proper dosage of potassium chloride to kill a patient, “the medical 
literature did not have articles specifying what dosages of the drugs were adequate to 
be lethal ….”114  Consequently, Leuchter relied on the information that was available 
for pigs and estimated accordingly.”115  This imprecision still permeates the practice 
of lethal injection. 
A few states such as North Carolina and New Jersey do not use the standard three 
drugs mentioned above while other states keep the drugs they use confidential.116  
Moreover, an “inordinate variation” exists in the dosages used among lethal injection 
states.117  Montana is probably the worst because “the amount of sodium pentothal is 
not a lethal dose; it is one-fourth or less than that used in other states.”118 
                                                                
109REFERENCE, supra note 107, at 1193. 
110Malone, supra note 108, at 6. 
111Denno, Paradox, supra note 2, at 109. 
112Id. at 109, n.321. 
113Id. 
114Id.  
115Id. at 100.  Significantly, Leuchter’s qualifications were later severely criticized when 
he was asked by neo-Nazis to prove that the Holocaust never happened.  Leuchter complied 
and fallaciously concluded that concentration camps did not hold executions because no 
evidence of lethal gas could be found in the walls.  It turned out that Leuchter’s only 
qualifications were college classes in chemistry and physics while studying for a B.A.  These 
events were thoroughly reported in the Errol Morris documentary, MR. DEATH:  THE RISE AND 
FALL OF FRED A. LEUCHTER JR. (Universal 1999). 
116Denno, Paradox, supra note 25, at 145, tbl. 11.  North Carolina only uses sodium 
thiopental and pancuronium bromide while New Jersey uses combinations of saline with 
potassium chloride and saline with sodium thiopental.  Id. 
117Id. at 120. 
118Id.  
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Similar improper dosages have caused several executions to be botched.  In 1989, 
executioners in Texas gave Stephen McCoy an insufficient dosage of drugs, resulting 
in “chok[ing] and heav[ing]” near the end of his execution.119  Even the Attorney 
General of Texas had to admit that “[t]he drugs might have been administered in a 
heavier dose or more rapidly.”120  A year later, in Illinois, Charles Walker was 
executed, and “[t]here was some indication that the first chemical may have worn off 
before Walker became unconscious.  ‘If this occurred…Walker would have slowly 
strangled and suffered excruciating pain while remaining completely immobile.’”121  
Unfortunately, witnesses could not see exactly what happened because “corrections 
officers ‘panicked’ and ordered that the blinds to the execution room be closed.”122 
A second problem is that many states do not provide adequate instructions for 
executioners; for instance, “[t]he high percentage of botches in Texas appear[s] to be 
partly attributable to the dearth of written procedures provided to executioners 
concerning how to perform an execution.”123  This problem is compounded by the 
last problem:  “untrained executioners.”124  The dearth of training for these 
individuals will be discussed further in infra section IV.C., but for now it will suffice 
to say that executioners have difficulty finding proper veins for injection and often 
insert catheters incorrectly.125 
In the lethal injection of Raymond Landry, executioners searched for a vein for 
forty minutes,126 and, later, the syringe fell out, “spewing deadly chemicals toward 
startled witnesses.”127  The execution of Joseph Cannon was suspended when 
“Cannon’s vein collapsed and the needle popped out after the first injection.  These 
events caused him to make a second final statement and be injected a second time 
behind closed curtains.”128 
When judges last reached the merits of the FDA’s inaction with regard to lethal 
injection drugs, the only significant evidence indicating the process was dangerous 
was a British report from the 1950s.  Now, this country has over three decades of 
experience with botched lethal injections causing prisoners inordinate suffering.  In 
fact, some sources have argued that lethal injection “is the most commonly botched 
execution in the United States”129 making it more harmful than other execution 
                                                                
119Dawn M. Weyrich, Gruesome Blunders; Botched Execution Spurs New Death Row 
Challenge, WASH. TIMES, June 7, 1990, at A1. 
120Witness to an Execution, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 27, 1989, at 11B. 
121Denno, Executions, supra note 9, at 433. 
122Id. at 434. 
123Denno, Paradox, supra note 25, at 111. 
124Id. at 110. 
125Id. 
126Michael deCourcy Hinds, Making Execution Humane (Or Can It Be?), N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 14, 1990, at 1. 
127Weyrich, supra note 119.  
128Denno, Paradox, supra note 25, at 139, tbl. 9. 
129Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 667 n.19 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Professor Michael 
Radelet). 
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procedures in practice if not in principle.130  It is important to note that the main 
problems of incorrect dosage and inadequate instructions for use are exactly the 
problems that would be solved by the FDA regulating lethal injection drugs as 
misbranded and as new uses for previously approved drugs.      
V.  THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE EXCEPTION 
During the Chaney litigation, the FDA argued “that state-sanctioned use of lethal 
injections comes within a commonly recognized exception to the Act’s broad and 
protective coverage:  the ‘practice-of-medicine’ exception.”131  Under this policy, the 
FDA will not interfere with practices that involve the medical judgments of 
physicians in treating patients.  The following four parts will discuss how lethal 
injection violates medical practice more than PAS. 
A.  Medical Association Views 
When the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional right to PAS, it focused 
heavily on the fact that the American Medical Association (AMA) had declared in its 
Code of Medical Ethics that “[p]hysician assisted suicide is fundamentally 
incompatible with the physician’s role as healer.”132  What the Court failed to note is 
that the AMA’s “policy regarding PAS was not made binding upon its members”133 
and that other groups such as the American Women’s Medical Association (AMWA) 
support the practice.134  Finally, despite the AMA’s “advisory” position, some studies 
indicate that at least half of all physicians support PAS in certain circumstances.135 
In contrast, the AMA has a much stricter mandatory policy against physician 
participation in executions, particularly those by lethal injection.  This policy holds 
that “[a] physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when 
there is hope of doing so, should not be a participant in a legally authorized 
                                                                
130Others have contended that lethal injection is even the least humane execution 
procedure without considering mistakes.  The main basis for this argument is that “[e]xecution 
by lethal injection takes much longer from start to finish than any other method, typically 30-
45 minutes ….  For the majority of this time the condemned person is fully aware of what is 
happening to them and able to experience their execution.”  Lethal Injection, supra note 65. 
131Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1179 (1983). 
132Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997). 
133W. Noel Keyes, The Choice of Participation by Physicians in Capital Punishment, 22 
WHITTIER L. REV. 809, 814 (2001). 
134See American Medical Women’s Association, Position Statement on Physician Assisted 
Suicide (Nov. 1997), (“The AMWA supports the right of physicians to engage in practice 
wherein they may provide a patient with, but not administer, a lethal dose of medication 
and/or medical knowledge, so that the patient can, without further assistance, end his/her 
life.”). available at http://www.amwa-doc.org/publications/Position_Papers/suicide.htm (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2004). 
135One “survey published in the New England Journal of Medicine found that 56% of 
responding doctors in Michigan preferred legalizing assisted suicide to an explicit ban.” 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 749, n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also ETHICS, supra note 82 
(“Surveys of individual physicians show that half believe that PAS is ethically justifiable in 
certain cases.”). 
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execution.”136  In fact, “AMA policy is ‘to inform state medical licensure boards and 
certification and recertification agencies that physician participation in supervising or 
administering lethal injections is a serious violation of the ethical standards of the 
medical profession.’”137  The AMA’s position “is particularly applicable to lethal 
injection, which requires relatively more medical skill [than other execution 
procedures] and has long been affiliated with the medical profession.”138   
The AMA is not alone in its position as “the World Medical Association, the 
Medical Societies of the Nordic Countries, and the American Psychiatric Association 
have all issued policy statements declaring that participation … was both unethical 
and subject to sanction.”139  Perhaps this stricter policy toward physician 
participation in executions reflects the fact that executions are more clearly violative 
of the Hippocratic Oath than PAS. 
B.  The Hippocratic Oath 
The fundamental principle guiding physicians in the practice of medicine is the 
Hippocratic Oath.  The Oath commands that physicians “shall do no harm.”140  Under 
the Oath, “[t]he concept of choice creates a significant disparity between [PAS] and 
capital punishment.”141  Ideally, PAS “involves the decision of a terminally ill, 
mentally competent adult making a reasoned choice to die."142  When a physician 
responds to this request and hastens the death of a cancer patient in severe pain with 
a few months to live, she could rationally be seen as not doing harm.  The same 
argument cannot be made about a physician participating in the involuntary 
execution of a healthy prisoner.  
C.  Physicians Play a More Active Role in Causing Death in 
Lethal Injection than in PAS 
In Vacco v. Quill, the Supreme Court found that New York’s legalization of the 
withdrawal of life support, while it continues to prohibit PAS, does not “violate[] the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”143  The Court held that these 
two groups of patients are not similarly situated because those requesting PAS 
                                                                
136Council on Ethical and Jud. Affairs, AMA, Council Rep., Physician Participation in 
Capital Punishment, 270 JAMA 365, 365 (1993).  The AMA’s more lenient position on PAS 
is partially based on the fact that there is less hope of preserving life in a terminally ill patient. 
137Keyes, supra note 133, at 811 (quoting Am. Med. Ass’n, Policy Compendium, H-
140.974 (1997 ed. 1997)). 
138Denno, Paradox, supra note 25, at 113. 
139Keyes, supra note 133, at 809, n.2; see also Bungled, supra note 104 (stating that “[t]he 
whole spectrum of medical professional groups has condemned the participation of physicians 
in the process”). 
140David L. Katy, Perry v. Louisiana:  Medical Ethics on Death Row -- Is Judicial 
Intervention Warranted?, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 707, 707 (1991) (citing the Hippocratic 
Oath). 
141Ragon, supra note 81, at 1001. 
142Id. 
143521 U.S. 793, 796-97 (1997). 
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require a physician to cause death actively while physicians can merely remove life 
support and let a patient die of natural causes.  While this dichotomy is suspect,144 it 
does establish a legitimate criterion for determining whether an act constitutes the 
legitimate practice of medicine:  the level of the physician’s participation in actively 
causing death.  This standard creates another argument against the federal 
government’s inconsistency, because physicians play a more active role in directly 
causing death through lethal injection than through PAS.   
Physicians in both cases prescribe a lethal dosage of drugs to be used in killing 
the patient, but the physician’s role ends there in the case of PAS.  This is “because 
[since]the patient must self-administer the drug, the patient brings about his or her 
own death.”145  In fact, the physician’s act of prescribing the drug is not even always 
temporally close to the death of the patient.  Often, a physician’s lethal prescription 
will not be used until “a few weeks or months later in a suicide,”146 if it is used at 
all.147   
This contrasts with capital punishment, where physicians are often present during 
the execution and contribute to bringing about death.  In capital punishment, 
physicians have undertaken an amalgam of further duties such as “preparing for, 
participating in, [and] monitoring executions or attempting to harvest prisoners’ 
organs for transportation.”148  This participation has even included physicians 
“inserting intravenous lines for lethal injections …”149 [/]and[/] “administering … 
injection drugs or their doses or types.”150  An example of this latter practice 
occurred in Illinois, where — before Governor Ryan placed a moratorium on 
executions151 — state law authorized physicians to kill prisoners by directly 
administering lethal injection drugs.152  Under Quill, this increased level of physician 
                                                                
144As previously noted, under PAS, the physician merely prescribes a lethal dose of drugs 
that the patient self-administers.  See supra note 37.  Often, however, “[w]ithdrawal of life 
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151See infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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Capital Punishment, 160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2912, 2912-13 (2000). 
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participation in actively causing death makes lethal injection more constitutionally 
suspect than PAS. 
D.  Lethal Injection Does Not Fit the Standard Model of the Practice of Medicine 
Under the standard model of medical treatment, when physicians prescribe drugs, 
either the physician, a trained and certified medical professional, or the patient 
herself, eventually administers the drugs.153  Some exceptions for drugs exist, such as 
insulin used for diabetics, but sodium “[t]hiopental is a controlled substance.  To use 
it you need a special license, which the executioner doesn’t have and the warden 
doesn’t have.”154  While physicians themselves sometimes administer lethal injection 
drugs, in most cases, minimally trained corrections staff members likely serve as 
executioners.155  Unfortunately, “[t]he thirty-[seven] lethal injection states provide 
minimal information in their protocols on the quality or training of those individuals 
selected to execute an inmate.”156  Only fourteen of these states even “mention 
‘training’ or ‘competency’ or ‘preparation’ or ‘practice’ for the executioners”, and 
these states still give “little to no indication of what kind of preparation the 
department of corrections offers.”157 
In at least eight states, “[c]riteria for selecting or training executioners … appear 
to be nonexistent.”158  In Arkansas, executions are left in the hands of “unpaid 
volunteers.”159  In other states, it is very likely that someone other than a physician 
must pronounce death.”160  This high level of participation by non-physicians or 
medical staff means that lethal injection differs substantially from the standard 
medical treatment model.  To this extent, lethal injection is less defensible as the 
“practice of medicine” than PAS.  
VI.  DULY AUTHORIZED STATE PRACTICE 
As previously noted there are at least three interpretations of the FDA 
Commissioner’s statement during the Chaney litigation that duly authorized state 
practices are not subject to judicial review.161  Under any of the interpretations, 
                                                                
153Most states have statutes only allowing those with medical training and state 
certification to administer drugs.  For instance, in Ohio, “[a] person needs a medical license or 
some other license with specific statutory authority to” administer drugs.  The State Medical 
Board of Ohio, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www5.state.oh.us/med/faq/acup-02.htm 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2004).   
154Bungled, supra note 104. 
155In other states, “a fully automated lethal injection machine is used ….”  Lethal 
Injection, supra note 65.  The later discredited Fred Leuchter created most of these machines.  
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.  
156Denno, Paradox, supra note 25, at 121. 
157Id. 
158Id. at 122. 
159Id. 
160See id. (holding that “in eight states, there is no mention that medical personnel are to 
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however, it appears that a state practice should be more insulated the less it has been 
circumscribed by the courts.  If the courts have found a law to be unconstitutional as 
applied in numerous situations, it seems fair to say that it is more constitutionally 
suspect than a practice that has not been so limited.  Under any fair standard, capital 
punishment has been less duly authorized than PAS. 
Beginning “[i]n the mid-1960s, [NAACP Legal Defense and Educational] Fund 
lawyers … [/]attempted[/] to convince the Supreme Court to abolish the death 
penalty.”162 Eventually, “in 1972 the Supreme Court determined that the imposition 
of the death penalty, as then applied, was cruel an unusual punishment  … [and] 
struck down all death penalty schemes then operating in the United States”163 in 
Furman v. Georgia.164  The Court found both that “existing death penalty laws … 
[were] administer[ed] … in an arbitrary and capricious way … [/]and that[/] racial 
discrimination infected the imposition of the death penalty, particularly for rape.”165 
Four years later, the Court effectively overturned Furman in Gregg v. Georgia,166 
holding that the death penalty was palatable when accompanied by “procedures 
intended to prevent [its] arbitrary imposition.”167  Despite this holding, “studies of 
the application of these rewritten statutes show[] continued disparities in the use of 
the death penalty by race of the defendant and especially by race of the victim.”168  
Concurrently, the number of exonerated “former death row inmates continues to 
climb above 100.”169  Responding to these concerns, governors in Illinois and 
Maryland recently imposed moratoria on imposition of the death penalty in their 
states.170  
Just last summer, the Supreme Court found that states cannot execute mentally 
retarded offenders171 and that judges, sitting alone, cannot determine the presence or 
absence of aggravating factors necessary for imposition of the death penalty after a 
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jury finds the defendant guilty of first-degree murder.172  The conclusion from this 
evidence is that execution is not a duly authorized state practice but a punishment 
with numerous flaws that often fails constitutional scrutiny in particular factual 
circumstances.  If the Court last summer determined that executions can violate the 
Bill of Rights based on who performs the execution and whom is executed, why 
should the FDA not question how the prisoner is executed? 
On the other hand, there has been no circumspection of PAS.  The only Supreme 
Court ruling discussing the legality of PAS was Glucksberg, where the Court gave 
states significant leniency in implementing PAS statutes.173  Opponents can 
justifiably argue that there has been much less time for the DWDA to be challenged 
then centuries old death penalty statutes.  Still, two points militate against this 
argument.  First, all of the challenges against the DWDA have been premised on the 
belief that PAS is an illegitimate practice, not on the basis that it is unconstitutional 
as applied.  The two congressional challenges and Ashcroft’s order all argued that 
PAS was not a legitimate practice of medicine because its purpose is to hasten 
death.174 
In essence, then, the federal challenge to PAS is that it is too effective in causing 
death, not that it causes deleterious side effects to patients.  The courts may very well 
find that PAS is unconstitutional in principle, but there have been no challenges to 
PAS as it is practiced in Oregon.175  This means that the federal government has 
presented no reasons why federal agencies should engage in a fact-sensitive analysis 
of whether PAS is being applied properly. 
Equally important is the fact that no challenges have come from the patients who 
are subject to the DWDA -- namely, terminally ill patients seeking to hasten their 
deaths.  The point here is relatively straightforward:  patients who want to hasten 
their deaths have no reason to challenge the legality of PAS statutes. 
Of course, the mere fact that patients want to receive a particular medication does 
not insulate the statute authorizing that distribution from congressional challenge.  In 
fact, just two years ago, the Supreme Court found that marijuana is subject to 
regulation under the CSA in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop.176  
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The important point here, however, is that marijuana is exactly the type of drug the 
CSA was intended to regulate.  As stated previously, the purpose of the CSA is to 
prevent the circulation of drugs that are abused, leading to depressant and other 
effects.177  By definition, no possibility of drug abuse and addiction exists when a 
patient takes drugs to hasten her death under PAS. 
Critics may argue that the flaw in this argument — and with this paper in general 
— is that the FDA has different goals in regulating drugs than does the DEA in 
enforcing the CSA.  In reality, however, this distinction should make the argument 
for regulation of lethal injection drugs stronger.  The question should be:  Is there a 
stronger basis for federal proscription of state PAS laws based on the potential of 
drugs causing death also leading to drug abuse, or is there a better argument that the 
federal government should regulate drugs used in lethal injections based on questions 
about the humanity of the procedure as applied?  If the United States Attorney 
General feels it is in the public interest to spend federal resources based on the 
tenuous link between PAS and drug abuse, why should the FDA continue to ignore 
empirical evidence that lethal injections are often botched because of improper drug 
combinations, dosages, and executioners? 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
When the FDA defended its inaction with regard to lethal injection drugs, little 
data existed about this new, seldom used method of execution.  As lethal injection 
has become the near exclusive method of execution in this country, it has become 
evident that fears about the safety of the procedure were justified.  With Ashcroft’s 
attack on physician-assisted suicide, it has become apparent that the federal 
government believes that it can and should challenge what states believe to be 
legitimate medical practices, even when a relatively small percentage of the 
population is at risk.  Based on this position, the FDA can no longer consistently 
hold that it should not regulate the drugs used in lethal injections.  
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